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Joint Symposium:  
Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and of the Legal State 
1. Introduction 
In the United States the rule of law is practically a civil religion. The rule of law 
is guarantor of Americans’ liberties. It protects them from government running 
amok. Today the American rule of law is under siege. The challenge does not 
come, however, from a Hitler on the right or a Stalin on the left who would over-
throw it.
2
 No. The challenge to the rule of law in America comes from the keep-
ers of the faith, i.e., from its evangelists, apostles, reformers, and just plain disci-
ples. Americans spread the gospel abroad and question whether they keep it at 
home.
3
 Libertarians think the United States needs better rules rather than fewer 
rules.
4
 Reformers see that the American rule of law undermines individual re-
sponsibility.
5
 Disciples see that American rules lead to bad decisions rather than 
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2
 This is not to belittle, however, that developments in terrorism and technology in this 
century, threaten to undermine the rule of law. 
3
 See Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2006), especially Frank Upham, “Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy,” in id. at 
75-104. 
4
 Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and 
the Rule of Law (2011). 
5
 Philip K. Howard, Rule of Nobody: Saving America from dead laws and senseless bu-
reaucracy [in press]. 






 Even pious parishioners in the pews perceive that, however well 
they believe that it protects individual liberty against tyrannical heads of state, 
the American rule of law comes up short in protecting and governing day-to-
day.
7
 It needs, scholars say, “rethinking.”
8
 
 Doubters of the American rule of law religion discern what true believers 
do not: the rule of law is not just about liberty. It is also about governing. That 
thought was in Americans’ minds at the beginning of the last century when they 
sang the second verse of the then recently written and still today popular national 
hymn, America the Beautiful: “America, America, God mend thy every flaw. 




 Doubters of the American rule of law religion observe what true believ-
ers overlook: an effective rule of law is a law of statutory rules. Judge-made 
precedents are secondary. That was in the minds of American lawyers already 
125 years ago when the American Bar Association resolved: “The law itself 
should be reduced, so far as its substantive principles are settled, to the form of a 
statute.”
10
 Then, even the truest of true believers in judge-made law, James C. 
Carter, the preeminent nineteenth century opponent of codification, limited his 
claims for the benefits of common law lawmaking to private law, i.e., claims of 
rights among individuals, and excluded “our public law, our statutory law, which 
relates to the Constitution, organization and administration of the state.”
11
 Today, 
however, American lawyers ignore that truth when they celebrate a contemporary 
common law of judicial lawmaking and ignore statutes of legislatures.
12
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 Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction of Legal Reasoning 
(2009). See James R. Maxeiner, “Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad: Putting Justice into 
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 Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (1886) at 72-74. 
11
 James C. Carter, Argument of James C. Carter in Opposition to the Bill to Establish a 
Civil Code, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Albany, March 23, 1887 at 26 [em-
phasis in original]. 
12
 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Common Law, Common Values, Common Rights, 
Essays on Our Common Heritage by Distinguished British and American Authors (2000) 
at viii.  




  Doubters of the American rule of law see two problems which are, in 
reality, two sides of the same coin. On the one side of the coin, they see rules of 
law that are excessively detailed and deny human judgment in their application. 
Rules and not people end up making decisions in matters that lawmakers never 
anticipated. The American rule of law today is, says law reformer Philip K. 
Howard, a “rule of nobody.” The language of dead legislators governs because 
they did not trust judges to carry out less detailed instructions. On the other side 
of the coin, doubters see judges that assert supremacy over the texts of statutes. 
Justice Antonin Scalia describes the ills that arise when “judges fashion law ra-
ther than fairly derive it from governing texts;” instead of following rules, judges 
“do what they want.”
13
 Common law lawmaking undercuts democracy.
14
 On the 




 The coin debased by common law lawmaking cannot buy good govern-
ment. Good government depends on statutes to go by itself. Only then can the 
governed and the governors alike apply laws, to themselves and to others using 
their common sense without being perplexed by unfathomable rules or being 
frustrated by unending procedure. Professor Richard A. Epstein, a libertarian, 
prescribes the cure: “make sure that the tasks that are given to the government are 
both limited and well-defined, and … let the people who are in charge have the 
degree of flexibility needed to carry out their task.”
16
  
 Americans can structure a government that works, but it requires cour-
age. To limit and to define the tasks given to government, while allowing flexi-
bility in carrying those tasks out, are matters of legislating. American skills with 
legislation are lacking. American skills in writing statutes are deficient. American 
skills in interpreting statutes are lacking. American skills in applying statutes are 
poor. Americans know that. The world knows that.
17
 Still, the task is managea-
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 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
(2012) at 4 and 9. 
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 Id. at 3. 
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 What doubters seek for America is reality abroad. It is a part of a legal 
state. Others can govern according to law: what is to stop the United States from 
developing good laws? 
 The rule of law religion and the contemporary common law are the show 
stoppers. They so dominate American thinking about law and legal methods that 
they leave no ground for better methods to take root.  
2. Contemporary Common Law  
According to American rule of law religion, the United States is a “common law” 
country where judicial precedents are the law and where statutes—even today—
are occasional interlopers.
19
 The American rule of law religion reflects the late 
nineteenth century rule of law popularized by the English jurist Albert Venn 
Dicey: common law, common law courts and no discretion in law application.
20
 
“The common law in the Anglo-American world is synonymous for most people 
with the rule of law.”
21
 
In the contemporary common law judges are supreme in lawmaking. 
Where there is no law or the law is found only in precedents, they have authority 
to make binding law, i.e., common law precedents binding in future cases (stare 
decisis). Where there are statues, they have authority to decide whether those 
laws are consistent with the U.S. Constitution (constitutional or judicial review, 
sometimes known as judicial supremacy). Moreover, where there are statutes—
                                                                                                                                                
quality of primary legislation. … More so than in other OECD countries, the United 
States has found it extremely difficult to improve legislative quality and coherence.”). 
18
 So said iconic contracts scholar Samuel Williston already in 1914. See Samuel Willis-
ton. “The Uniform Partnership Act with some other remarks on other Uniform Commer-
cial Laws, An Address before the Law Association of Philadelphia December 18, 1914” 
(1915) at 2 reprinted in 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 196  (1915) at 197. 
19
 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning, Revised Edition 
(2004) at 71. For views skeptical of common law carryover see, e.g., Calvin Woodard, 
“Is the United States a Common Law Country?” in Essays on English Law and the Amer-
ican Experience (Elisabeth A. Cawthon and David E. Narrett, eds., 1994) at 120; Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969) at 291-305; For 
views skeptical of the utility of the common law, see, e.g., Frederick Schauer, “The Fail-
ure of the Common Law,” 36 Ariz. St. L. J. 765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, “Do Cases 
Make Bad Law?”, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006); Gordon Tullock, The Case Against the 
Common Law (1997). 
20
 Chapter 4 “Rule of Law,” in Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution (1885). 
21
 John V. Orth, “Common Law and United States Legal Tradition,” in The Oxford Com-
panion to American Law (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 2002) 127, 129.  




which today, is just about everywhere—judges assert that they have authority to 
determine the meaning of statutes not only for the cases they are presently decid-
ing, but for future cases (statutory precedent or statutory stare decisis).
22
  
Contemporary common law thus extends judicial supremacy over the 
constitutional validity of statutes to judicial supremacy over the meaning and ap-
plication of statutes. It makes judicial precedents the starting points for legal rea-
soning rather than statutory texts. It demonetizes legislation. It encourages legis-
lators to leave to judges the last word in making law: judges will take it any-
way.
23
 It compromises governing by law. 
Contemporary common law concentrates on litigation. In litigation judg-
es are authorized—indeed, they are required—to decide rights between two com-
peting parties before the court. Only in their own world of judicial supremacy, 
however, do judges in such cases have legal authority or legislative legitimacy to 
decide, not just the cases before them, but what will be law in future cases decid-
ed according to the statutes they apply.
24
  
Applying contemporary common law in statutory cases makes a mockery 
of the idea that law is a set of democratically established rules, applied to the 
facts of cases, by those subject to law and by those who govern.
25
 Contemporary 
common law in its concentration on litigation dovetails well with the concentra-
tion of the American rule of law religion on guaranteeing individual rights to the 
practical exclusion of good governing. The contemporary common law was a bad 
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 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 13, at 5; Peter L. Strauss, “The Common Law 
and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 243 (1998) 
23
 See John V. Orth, “The Persistence of the Common Law,” in John V. Orth, How Many 
Judges does it take to make a Supreme Court? And Other Essays on Law and the Consti-
tution (2006) at 73, 83 (“a statute is characteristically approached through prior cases that 
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lation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national prob-
lem but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nitty-gritty.” 
24
 See, e.g., 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Criminal Procedure, 
(1866) at 704-706 (chap. LIX, §§ 1030-1032); William G. Hammond, “Notes to Laws of 
England, No. 30,” in 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Wil-
liam G. Hammond, ed., 1890) at 213-226; American Bar Association, Report of the 
Committee on Legal Education Presented at the Annual Meeting in Boston, August 26, 
1891 (1891) at 44. See also Orth, “Can the Common Law Be Unconstitutional?” in Orth, 
supra note 23, at 53, 61-62. 
25
 See Scalia & Garner, supra note 13, at 3-5, 83, 509, 517. 




choice of American law when judges adopted it gradually in the course of the 
nineteenth century. That it did not work well was amply proven by American 
government in the twentieth century. That it should not be the future of American 
law in the twenty-first century is the challenge that the doubters make. 
Faced with the evidence of failure of the contemporary common law, 
true believers find solace in saying that that is the price we pay for a government 
under law. No other way can work. Our American ways must be the best—at 
least for us Americans (American exceptionalism). Received wisdom clings to a 
view of history that holds that this is the way Americans have always done law. 
So the late Justice Brennan introduced American law to neophytes with the con-
ventional view of American legal history:  
In the early years of the republic ‘American’ law was, in 
fact, largely English common law. It was transplanted by a group 
of former colonial subjects who had begun their revolution in or-
der to secure their ‘rights as Englishmen.’ In the nineteenth cen-
tury, legal innovation occurred mostly at the state level, as com-
mon law courts adapted old doctrines to the circumstances of a 
new and growing nation. In [the twentieth] century, the momen-
tum of reform began to shift to the federal government [and to] 
… a coming supremacy of federal law [and] federal legislation.
26
 
Received wisdom is myth. Its view of history is false.
27
 What the American colo-
nists brought with them and what they sought presents no monolithic picture: 
early America was a land of “many legalities.”
28
 The picture of common law in 
colonial America was complex. The colonies varied from colony-to-colony in 
what they adopted. None adopted common law wholesale; each adapted it to lo-
cal conditions. They chose among common law rules (e.g., land tenures, crimes 
and punishments, forms of action) and common law institutions (e.g., courts, ju-
ry). The rudimentary nature of courts and law practice, as well as limitations on 
law reporting—there were no printed American law reports and English reports 
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 William J. Brennan, Jr., “Introduction” in New York University School of Law, Fun-
damentals of American Law 1, 3 (1996). 
27
 It may be historically inaccurate, but it still has such a hold on the American legal mind 
that even a judge and scholar who suggests that, relegates that truth to a footnote. Guido 
Calebresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1980) at 185 n. 10 (“I would hasten to 
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Mann, eds., 2001); William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, Vol. I, 
The Chesapeake and New England 1607-1660 ( 2008), Vol. II, The Middle Colonies and 
the Carolinas, 1660-1730 (2012).  




were hard to come by—made adoption of eighteenth century common law meth-
ods (known as “declaring law”) difficult. Of course, they could not have adopted 
contemporary common law methods (known as lawmaking), for those methods 
were yet to be developed.
29
 Before the Revolution there were no published Amer-
ican precedents, but there many written laws.  
Received wisdom ignores centuries of Americans searching for liberty 
and common good in written law.  
In the seventeenth century, even before the Pilgrims went ashore on the 
American Continent, aboard the Mayflower anchored in Massachusetts Bay, they 
agreed in the Mayflower Compact to  
Combine ourselves together into a Civil Body Politic, for our 
better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends 
aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute and frame 
such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and 
Offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and 
convenient for the general good of the Colony, unto which we 
promise all due submission and obedience.  
Soon colonists in Massachusetts adopted written laws. The preamble of the 
Lawes and Libertyes of Masschusetts of 1647 colorfully explains why: “a Com-
mon-wealth without lawes is like a Ship without rigging and steeradge.”
30
 They 
knew that written laws—and not precedents—are how societies run and guide 
themselves. Their leaders provided a book of laws to “satisfie your longing ex-
pectation, and frequent complaints for want of such a volume to be published in 
print: wherin (upon every occasion) you might readily see the rule which you 
ought to walke by.” 
In the eighteenth century, founders of the American republic, such as 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, sought a “government of laws and not of 
men.” Their nineteenth successors, Justice Joseph Story, President Abraham Lin-
coln and codifier David Dudley Field, looked to written law to govern. Ameri-
cans legislated. Constitutional conventions created and amended state constitu-
tions: in the first one hundred and ten years, to 1887, according to one count, one 
hundred four state constitutions and two hundred and fourteen partial amend-
                                                          
29
 See Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (2
nd
 ed., 1894) at 75-80. See also note 24 
supra (giving other authorities rejecting theory of common law lawmaking and accepting 
declaring law theory). 
30
 The Lawes and Libertyes of Massachusetts (1847). See Edmund S. Morgan, The Puri-
tan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop (3
rd
 ed., 2007) 156-160. 






  Every state legislature codified, revised or compiled its statutes. Civic 
leaders celebrated America’s heritage of written laws at annual Fourth of July 
convocations. Civics text books taught of democratically adopted statutes. An 




In 1876, the North American Review, then under the editorship of Henry 
Adams and possibly the nation’s most important intellectual magazine, published 
in its commemoration of the centennial of the American republic: “The great fact 
in the progress of American jurisprudence which deserves special notice and re-
flection is its tendency towards organic statute law and towards the systematizing 
of law; in other words, towards written constitutions and codification.”
33
  A com-
peting commemorative volume sponsored by Harpers Monthly Magazine, ob-
served that “The art of administering government according to the directions of a 
written constitution may fairly be named among the products of American 
thought and effort during our century.”
34
 That of which rule of law doubters to-
day dream was thought the American exceptionalism of the day:  
Our idea is that … all the powers of government, all the authori-
ty which society can rightly exercise towards individuals, are 
originally vested in the masses of the people; that the people 
meet together (by their delegates) to organize a government, and 
freely decide what officers they will have to act for them in mak-
ing and administering laws, and what the powers of these offic-
ers shall be. These written directions of the people, declaring 
what their officers may do and what they may not, form the con-
stitution. The idea, in its practical development, is American.
35
 
With written constitutions go written laws. The Harper’s commemoration con-
tinued: “The readiness of American Legislatures to codify or systematize the 
laws is a noticeable feature. … There does not appear to be any state, with per-
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 Henry Hitchcock, American State Constitutions: A Study of their Growth (1887) at 13-
14. 
32
 Contrast, Guido Calebresi, A Common Law for an Age of Statutes (1980), at 1. 
33
 George Tucker Bispham, “Law in America, 1776-1876,” in North American Review, 
vol. 122 (January 1876) 154, at 174 [emphasis in original]. 
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 Id. at 438.  




haps the exception of Pennsylvania and Tennessee, which does not possess a 
codification or revision of the laws made since the commencement of 1860.”
36
 
Even as most Americans were looking to legislative rules, from the ranks 
of judges and legal practitioners came another vision: judge-made law and judi-
cial supremacy. According to legal historian Kermit Hall, “the single most signif-
icant feature in nineteenth-century American legal culture was the steady rise of 
judicial authority.”
37
 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the newly 
emerging legal professions combined to assert contemporary common law and 
judicial supremacy. Already in 1870 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. claimed that “It 
is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the 
principle afterwards.”
38
 Come 1915 Samuel Williston, iconic contracts scholar of 
the day, reported the triumph of contemporary common law lawmaking over 
statute lawmaking: “Codification has an ugly sound to most American lawyers. 
We have been trained to believe that no code can be expressed with sufficient 
exactness, or can be sufficiently elastic to fulfill adequately the functions of our 
common law.”
39
 On the eve of the nation’s sesquicentennial in 1926 the consen-
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 Id. at 451.  
37
 Kermit L. Hall, “History of American Law: Antebellum through Reconstruction, 1801-
1877,” in Oxford Companion to American Law (Kermit Hall, ed., 2002) 374, at 381. 
Those with foreign experiences did not, however, judge American efforts at statutory 
lawmaking to be unique or effective. They saw the coming of judicial supremacy. See, 
e.g., “German Legislation,” 10 Am. L. Rev. (1875) 270, at 280-281 (“The results which 
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of society which is the foundation of law and good government is less and less represent-
ed in our legislative bodies. They have fallen under the control of private and local inter-
ests and questions of the moment. Like their spirit, their methods and traditions become 
less adapted to produce valuable results, and statutes are accordingly more careless and 
short-lived. So great is this deterioration, and the consequent loss of public respect and 
influence, that the question has been raised as to the ultimate end of these bodies, which 
seems almost approaching. … The authority which has slipped from their hands has 
passed into those of the courts.”) Generally on legislative or judicial supremacy, see the 
works of Charles Groves Haines, inter alia, The American Doctrine of Judicial Suprema-
cy (2d ed. 1932); “Legislative, Judicial or Executive Supremacy,” Chapter XV, in Charles 





 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Codes and the Arrangement of the Law,” 5 Am. L. Rev. 1 
(1870). See Frederick Schauer, “Do Cases Make Bad Law?,” 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 
(2006) at 885. 
39
 Samuel Williston. The Uniform Partnership Act with some other remarks on other Uni-
form Commercial Laws, An Address before the Law Association of Philadelphia Decem-
ber 18, 1914 (1915) at 1-2, reprinted in 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 196  (1915). The new legal 




sus of the American Bar Association’s meeting in London was that to adopt a 
code was an un-American attempt “to supplant the parent Common Law” and “to 
forsake our English heritage and follow the lead of Imperial Rome.”
40
 In just fifty 
years between the nation’s centennial in 1876 and its sesquicentennial in 1926 




By the time the bicentennial celebration rolled around in 1976, the ABA 
commemorative volumes did not even note the triumph of common law over 
written law; they simply assumed it.
42
 At the turn of this century in 2000 the 
ABA commemorative volume in its “Principles” section at book’s outset claimed 
that “The common law provides the tools and flexibility to allow the law to con-
tinue to serve the needs of a diverse society in a world of rapid change and tech-
                                                                                                                                                
“science” of Langdell had no room for statutes, where judicial decisions were the exclu-
sive subject of scientific study. 
40
 J. Carroll Hayes, “The Visit to England of the American Bar Association,” in The 
American Bar Association London Meeting 1924: Impressions of Its Social, Official, Pro-
fessional and Juridical Aspects as Related by Participants in Contest for Most Enlighten-
ing Review of Trip (1925) 9, at 15. 
41
 The shift is evident in the institutional history of the American Bar Association. The 
ABA was founded in in the spirit of statutes. Article I of its Constitution provided that 
one of the Association’s three objects was to promote “the uniformity of legislation 
throughout the Union.” American Bar Association, Call for a Conference, Proceedings of 
Conference, First Meeting of the Association; Officers, Members, etc. (1878) at 16 (as 
proposed), at 30 (as adopted).
 
Article III required that the President open each annual 
meeting with an address on the “most noteworthy changes in statute law … during the 
preceding year.” Id. at 18, 32. On the second day of the first meeting, the first elected 
president, in the second sentence of his first address, expounded on the “noble” purpose 
of the Association “to codify and harmonize” the law.” Id. at 32.  The ABA was, howev-
er, a creature of its time. Its devotion to statutes flagged and its fascination with judicial 
supremacy jumped. In 1913 the Association amended its Constitution to drop the re-
quirement that the President open the annual meeting with an address on the most note-
worthy statutes. In 1919 it adopted a new constitution that modified its object to seek not 
only “uniformity of legislation” but also “judicial decision throughout the nation.” 
42
 See Harry W. Jones, “The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and 
American Variations,” in Political Separation and Legal Community 91 (American Bar 
Association, Common Faith and Common Law, Papers Prepared for the Bicentennial 
Observance, Harry W. Jones, ed., 1976); Legal Institutions Today: English and American 
Approaches Compared unnumbered vii-viii (American Bar Association, Common Faith 
and Common Law, Papers Prepared for the Bicentennial Observance, Harry W. Jones, 
ed. 1977). 






 Common law and rule of law are held to be practically 
one and the same.
44
  
Americans need to start over.  They need a legal state that works. The 
failures of the American legal system and the successes of foreign systems are 
not reasonably deniable.
45
 The contemporary common law of judicial supremacy 
over statutes is not an essential part of American law or of American liberty. Ju-
dicial supremacy is not a part of American legal DNA. Legislative supremacy 
has a better claim. It was present in the legislative work of John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson.
46
   
3. Adams and Jefferson as Legislators  
 
“They formed a system of government, and a code of laws, such 
as the wisdom of man had never before devised.”  
Sheldon Smith  





The American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 for many people 
around the world presents the premier principles of protection of individual 
                                                          
43
 Common Law, Common Values, Common Rights, Essays on Our Common Heritage by 




 See, e.g., “German Legislation,” supra note 35, at 283 (“Americans abroad are apt to 
fall into one of two classes; either to be irritated, in the presence of an older civilization, 
into a spread-eagle state of mind, or else to fall down and worship it. The writer will be 
acquitted of belonging to the former, and no declaration of independence will save him if 
he is thought to have dealt in too rosy colors. Political institutions [in Germany] are of-
fensive, but he admits a feeling of satisfaction in seeing or thinking he sees the law, 
which is every man's attendant through life, walking by his side in modern dress, and 
speaking a language which everyone understands.”). See also James R. Maxeiner with 
Gyooho Lee and Armin Weber, Failures of American Civil Justice in International Per-
spective (2011).  
46
 See A. London Fell, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State, Vol-
ume Six: American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import and Fore-
ground, Book I: Foundations (to Early 19
th
 Century) (2004). 
47
 Sheldon Smith, “Eulogy Pronounced at Buffalo New York July, 22
nd
, 1826,” in A Se-
lection of Eulogies, Pronounced in the Several States, in Honor of those Illustrious Patri-
ots and Statesmen, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson (1826) at 91, 94.  






 And in the protection of individual rights, Americans see the essence of 
the rule of law.
49
  
More than any other two people, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson 
brought the Declaration of Independence in being. They acted to make the repub-
lican ideals of the Declaration reality in law.  For Adams it was a frame of gov-
ernment; for Jefferson it was the nuts and bolts of government itself. In fall 1779 
Adams drafted the Constitution and Form of Government of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, which is still law today. There he coined the phrase of a “gov-
ernment of laws, not of men” that into the twentieth century described what 
Americans today call the rule of law. From fall 1776 through spring 1779 Jeffer-
son wrote the laws for a republican government for Virginia. He provided legis-
lation for reformation of the law of the nation’s most populous state. James Mad-
ison described Jefferson’s reformation as “a mine of legislative wealth, and a 
model of statutory composition.”
50
 
 In the world of Adams and Jefferson, law is about legislation and gov-
ernment is about governing. Written laws decide principles beforehand and au-
thorize governors and governed alike to decide according to those principles. 
Democratically selected legislatures are supreme and not judges. States have 
governments of laws and not of men. 
True believers in the contemporary common law cannot accept that the 
founders’ world revolved around written law and not around common law, 
around legislators and not around judges, and around governing and not around 
resolving disputes. So one writes:  
The leaders of the American Revolution, such as John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson talked grandly about breaking with the 
European past and starting “a new order of the world.” But when 
the Constitutional Convention met in a steamy summer in Phila-
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delphia in 1787, it was with the assumption that English com-
mon law would continue unchanged in the United States.
51
 
Today scholars look beyond such false received wisdom. They tell us that that 
the state constitutions of the time, together with the Declaration of Independence 
“most authentically document the irreversible American commitment to Republi-
canism in 1776.”
52
 They perceive in Jefferson’s legislation “a rare and compre-
hensive view of how a founder envisioned an actual republican society.”
53
  
4. Adams’ Constitution: The Frame of Government 
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
 
You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time 
when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to 
live. … When before the present epoch, had three millions of 
people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the 
wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can con-
trive? 
John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776) 
John Adams wrote the oldest constitution that is still in force today: the 
1780 Constitution and Form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts.
54
 In it Adams combined “A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” as Part the First, and “The Frame of 
Government,” as Part the Second. He placed the idea of “a government of laws 
and not of men” literally between the two Parts. 
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 Chronicle. That Adams had the opportunity to draft the Massachusetts 
Constitution is a remarkable story in itself. An earlier attempt at a constitution for 
the state had failed; Massachusetts was the last state to follow the April 1776 call 
of the Continental Congress to write a state constitution. But Adams left the 
United States in 1778 for ten years in Europe. In that decade, he was home for 
just three months. Yet it was in those three months that Adams was elected to the 
be a delegate to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, the Convention 
assembled, appointed Adams to the Committee to write the State Constitution, 
and Adams, in September and October 1779, wrote it. Before the Convention 
could approve his draft, he was gone for Europe.  
In writing the Constitution Adams relied on his 1776 pamphlet Thoughts 
on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the American Colonies.
55
 That 
pamphlet brought him acclaim, contributed to his role in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and made him someone for others to consult in drafting their state con-
stitutions. It was there that he wrote that “the very definition of a republic ‘is an 
empire of laws, and not of men’” and that “a republic is the best of govern-
ments.” He took the term from James Harrington’s Oceana. For Massachusetts 
Adams wrote of a government and not an empire of laws. 
Adams wrote Thoughts on Government to give to other Americans on 
how they might create constitutions and institutions for governing the new states 
coming into being in 1776. He began by rejecting Pope’s famous aphorism “The 
forms of government let fools contest: That which is best administered is best.” 
Adams said no: “Pope flattered tyrants too much …. Nothing could be more fal-
lacious than this.” The form of government does make a difference, he asserted. 
“Nothing is more certain, from the history of nations and the nature of men, that 
some forms of government are better fitted for being well-administered than oth-
ers.” And so, Adams asked: “As good government is an empire of laws, how 




Adams’ Constitution and Frame of Government. It is anachronistic to de-
scribe a document of 1780 in terms that were not to achieve currency for another 
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century. Yet Adam’s Constitution anticipates the balanced approach of a legal 
state which accommodates individual rights and governing together more than it 
foreshadows the individual rights-focused American rule of law. It looks more 
like a legal state founded on statute law and a principle of legality than it does 
like a rule of law content with judge-made law and inherent authority. It antici-
pates laws that are integrated and stable that people can follow more than an ev-
er-changing mix of judicial precedents. It is for the legislature to state the laws, 
for the executive to carry them out, and for the judiciary to accept the reasoned 
judgments of both.   
 The preamble of Adams’ constitution begins stating that government 
balances common good and individual rights: “The end of the institution, 
maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence of the 
body-politic, to protect it, and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the 
power of enjoying, in safety and tranquility, their natural rights and the blessings 
of life.”  
The preamble’s second paragraph states the means to accomplish this 
end: “certain laws for the common good.” So it is “a duty of the people … to 
provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for an impartial inter-
pretation, and a faithful execution of them.” It is through these written laws, “that 
everyman may at all times, find his security in them.”  The preamble concludes 
“We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, … do agree upon, ordain and estab-
lish the following declaration of rights and frame of government as the constitu-
tion of the commonwealth of Massachusetts.”  
 Adams’ “government of laws and not of men” is part of the statement of 
the principle of a separation of powers among legislative, executive and judicial 
branches of government. It occupies a mediating place between individual rights 
and common good. In the Constitution it literally stands between two parts, Part 
the First, Declaration of Rights, and Part the Second, Frame of Government. Ad-
ams, in his draft placed it at the beginning of Part the Second, Frame of Govern-
ment. The Constitutional Convention moved it to the end of Part the First. Where 
Adams in his draft only provided that “the legislative, executive and judicial 
power shall be placed in separate departments,” the Convention in the final ver-
sion, besides moving the provision from one part to the other, declared that each 
of the branches “shall never exercise” powers of the other.  
 Written law. Adams’ Constitution provides a frame for statute law and 
governing. Chapter I, Section I, Article IV of Part the Second, the Frame of Gov-




ernment, gives the legislature authority “to make, ordain, and establish all man-
ner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, direc-
tions and instructions, either with penalties or without, so as the same be not re-
pugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and 
welfare of this commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and 
of the subjects of the same, and for the necessary support and defence of the gov-
ernment thereof.” Article XXII of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights, calls 
on the legislature frequently to assemble “for address[ing] of grievances, for cor-
recting, strengthening, and confirming the laws, and for making new laws, as the 
common good may require.” 
 Adams’ Constitution does not contemplate contemporary judge-made 
law or judicial supremacy. Article X of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights 
provides: “In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by any 
other laws than those to which their constitutional representative body have given 
their consent.” Article XX adds: “The power of suspending the laws, or the exe-
cution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by au-
thority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legis-
lature shall expressly provide for.” 
 Adams’ Constitution commands “standing laws” to protect the people 
from rapid changes in law. Article X of Part the First, the Declaration of Rights 
provides: “Every individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the 
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws.” Later 
Adams explained that a constant changing of the laws though judicial decision or 
through legislation denies the people the benefit of law.
57
 
Adams’ constitution anticipates laws that are coordinated one with an-
other.
58
 Article 6 of Part the Second, the Frame of Government, avoids a gap in 
law by providing that “All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, 
and approved in the province, colony, or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually 
practiced on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force, until al-
tered or repealed by the legislature, such parts only excepted as are repugnant to 
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the rights and liberties contained in this constitution.” To assure consistency 
Chapter III, Article II gives executive and legislative branches “authority to re-
quire the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court upon important 
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions.” Article XXIX of Part the First, the 
Declaration of Rights calls for “an impartial interpretation of the laws, and ad-
ministration of justice.” 
 Law for governing. Adams’ constitution looks for a government that will 
govern according to law. It does not limit the executive branch to acting only in 
response to explicit statutory direction. For example, Chapter II Section I Article 
IV of Part the Second, the Frame of Government, provides that “The governor 
shall have authority, from time to time, at his discretion, to assemble and call to-
gether the councillors of this commonwealth for the time being; and the gover-
nor, with the said councillors, or five of them at least, shall and may, from time to 
time, hold and keep a council, for the ordering and directing the affairs of the 
commonwealth, agreeably to the constitution and the laws of the land.” Later 
Adams explained: “The executive power is properly the government; the laws are 
a dead letter until an administration begins to carry them into execution.”
59
 
Adams’ Constitution comes close to anticipating a requirement of statu-
tory authority for government action, i.e., a principle of legality. Article XVIII of 
Part the First, the Declaration of Rights, provides that the people “have a right to 
require of their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observation of 
them [i.e. fundamental principles of the constitution], in the formation and execu-
tion of the laws necessary for the good administration of the commonwealth.” It 
allows for exceptions to rights, such as search warrant may issue, and soldiers 
may be quartered in homes, but only “with the formalities, prescribed by the 
laws” or “in a manner ordained by the legislature.”
60
 Government officers are to 
swear to carry out their duties “agreeably to the rules and regulations of the con-
stitution and the laws of the commonwealth.”
61
 
Adams’ Constitution sets out a frame of a government of laws and not of 
men, i.e., a legal state. But what would an American legal state look like? Jeffer-
son’s legislation suggests one such state. 
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5. Jefferson’s Legislation: A Government of Laws for 
the Commonwealth of Virginia 
 
When I left Congress in 76, it was in the persuasion that our 
whole code must be reviewed, adapted to our republican form of 
government, and, now that we had no negatives of Councils, 
Governors & Kings to restrain us from doing right, that it should 
be corrected in all its parts, with a single eye to reason, & the 




Jefferson’s lawmaking from 1776 to 1779 is unparalleled in American history. 
No American legislator before or since has accomplished so much of such im-
portance in such a short period of time. In three weeks in June 1776 he drafted 
the Declaration of Independence. In three years following he drafted the laws for  
a republican government.”
63
 In the words of a contemporary biographer Jefferson 
created “a model for other states” and “invented the United States of America.”
64
 
His vision was of a government of laws, not of judges. 
Chronicle. When Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence in 
June 1776, on his mind he had as much building a government of laws as declar-
ing rights and independence.
65
 Upon arrival in Philadelphia in May for congress, 
he wrote a friend back home that the government to be established was “the 
whole object of the present controversy.” If that government were no good, inde-
pendence would be pointless. It would be just as well to accept “the bad one of-
fered to us from beyond the water without the risk & expence of contest.”
66
 In 
                                                          
62
 The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, 1743-1790, Together with a Summary of the 
Chief Events in Jefferson’s Life (Edited by Paul Leicester Ford, 1914; New Introduction 
by Michael Zuckerman, 2005) at 67. 
63
 Lerner, supra note 53, at 61 writes of “Jefferson’s grand design to make the promise of 
the Declaration a reality.” 
64
 Willard Sterne Randall, Thomas Jefferson: A Life (1993), at 306. 
65
 The Declaration itself demonstrates the importance that Jefferson placed on legislation. 
All of the first named grounds for independence are charges of bad government and not 
of violations of individual rights. The very first (of many) reads: “he has refused his as-
sent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.” 
66
Jefferson to Thomas Nelson, May 16, 1776, in 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Vol. 
1, 1760 to 1776) (Julian P. Boyd, ed., 1950), at 292.  




distant Philadelphia he worked as hard on a constitution for Virginia as on a dec-
laration of a United States. To his life-long frustration, his draft arrived too late.
67
 
In July and August 1776 as Jefferson remained in Philadelphia he was in 
correspondence with Edmund Pendleton, who would soon be first speaker of the 
new Virginia House of Delegates. In one letter Pendleton urged Jefferson to re-
turn home as Jefferson was needed “much in the Revision of our Laws and form-
ing a new body.”
68
 In another Pendleton asked Jefferson to elaborate on his plans 
for changes in land tenures, elections, suffrage and penal law. Did Jefferson real-
ly intend, Pendleton asked, “to relax all Punishments and rely on virtue and the 
Public good as Sufficient to promote Obedience to the laws.”
69
 
No work was of greater urgency for Jefferson than his legislation. He ex-
pected the war to be short. He did not stay in Philadelphia a moment longer than 
he had to. He rushed home to Virginia. A republican state needed republican 
laws. “It can never be too often repeated,” he later wrote,” that the time for fixing 
every essential right on a legal basis is when our rulers are honest, and ourselves 
united. From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill.”
70
  
No work had more substance for Jefferson than building a government of 
laws. He wrote in his autobiography, “I knew that our legislation under the regal 
government had many vicious points which urgently required reformation, and I 
thought I could be of more use in forwarding that work. I therefore retired from 
my seat in Congress on the 2d. day of Sep., resigned it, and took my place in the 
legislature of my state.’”
71
 When a messenger reached him in Virginia with a 
Congressional commission to join Benjamin Franklin on the critical mission to 
France, Jefferson took three days to think it over—keeping the messenger wait-
ing—and finally declined the appointment.  
From October 1776, when Jefferson joined the state legislature, until 
June 1779, when he became governor, Jefferson did little else than work on legis-
lation. His work took two forms: (1) drafting bills on particular subjects, e.g., 
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civil justice, property law, the established church, importation of slaves, and nat-
uralization; and (2) systematic review and reform of Virginia law.
72
 The latter is 
known as the “Revisal.” The Revisal was literally two bundles of 126 bills that 
the Virginia House Committee on Revision under Jefferson’s leadership prepared 
from October 1776 to June 1779.
73
  
Jefferson on joining the legislature lost no time in getting to work on 
building a government of laws. On Monday, October 7, 1776 he took his seat. 
Within the week, he had three major pieces of legislation underway. On Friday, 
October 11, he obtained leave to bring in a bill to establish courts of justice. For 
that work alone he has been recognized “as the preeminent architect of Virginia’s 
judiciary.”
74
 On Saturday the 12
th
, he obtained leave to bring in two bills: a “Bill 
to Enable Tenants in Fee Tail to Convey Their Lands in Fee Simple”
75
 and a 
“Bill for the Revision of the Laws.”
76
 On Monday, the 14
th
, he introduced both 
bills. The former, was the first of his “great reform bills, which he hoped would 
destroy the foundations of an aristocracy of wealth.” It was the less important of 
the two!
77
 The legislature adopted it on Saturday, November 1, without substan-
tial change. Already on the Wednesday, the 23
rd
, it had approved the Bill for the 
Revision of the laws. Americans speak of a president’s first hundred days in of-
fice. Jefferson, in office only as state legislator, in a scant twenty-six days, over-
turned the common law of land tenures, began creation of a new set of courts, 
and authorized a total overhaul of Virginia law.  
November 3, 1776 the Assembly appointed the Committee of five to re-
form Virginia law.  By giving the younger Jefferson the most votes, it made him 
de facto chair. Of the four other members, it was Jefferson’s former law teacher, 
George Wythe, who contributed most to the revision.
78
 The Act creating the 
Committee gave it “full power and authority to revise, alter, amend, repeal or 
introduce all or any of the said laws, to form the same into bills, and report them 
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to the next meeting of the General Assembly.” The charge to the committee—
written by Jefferson—was expansive: 
Whereas the later change which hath of necessity been 
introduced into the form of government in this country, it is be-
come also necessary to make corresponding changes in the laws 
heretofore in force, many of which are inapplicable to the pow-
ers of government as now organized, others are founded on prin-
ciples heterogeneous to the republican spirit, others which, long 
before such change, had been oppressive to the people, could yet 
never be repealed while the regal power continued, and others, 
having taken their origin while our ancestors remained in Britain, 
are not so well adapted to our present circumstances of time and 
place, and it is also necessary to introduce certain other laws, 
which, though proved by the experience of other states to be 
friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind, we have not hereto-
fore been permitted to adopt .…”
79
  
The Committee presented its report June 18, 1779. Owing to the war and the 
British invasion of Virginia, the Assembly did not take up the report until years 
later. In 1784 it ordered the report printed. By then Jefferson was away for a five 
year mission in Europe.  
In Jefferson’s absence it was James Madison who brought Jefferson’s 
legislation to the Assembly and took over sponsorship from 1785 to 1787. Madi-
son’s central role in presenting Jefferson’s anti-common law revision to the Vir-
ginia Assembly just months before the 1787 convocation of the U.S. Constitu-
tional Convention contradicts the claim that the Convention convened with the 




October 31, 1785 Madison introduced 118 of the report’s 126 bills. In 
that session the legislature adopted thirty-five bills and put the remainder over to 
the October 1786 session. In the October 1786 session Madison secured the 
adoption of another twenty-three. At the end of that session, on January 2, 1787, 
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the Assembly with Madison’s support referred the balance of Jefferson’s pro-
posal for updating to a new committee of revisors and for future action.
81
 
Jefferson’s government of laws. Jefferson has rightly been called Jeffer-
son the legislator, Jefferson the lawmaker and Jefferson the law giver. Just as 
Jefferson’s contemporaries Catherine the Great, Frederick the Great and Napole-
on are remembered for their legislation, so too should Jefferson be remembered 
for his. His work was no less impressive nor was it less extensive. And, except 
for Catherine’s Proposal for a New Code, he got there first. Moreover, he did the 
work himself! Yet Jefferson’s legislation is unknown among American lawyers. 
Law schools pay it no mind.
82
 
Laymen debate whether the Revisal was “a complete codification” or a 
“compilation of laws in force.”
83
 It was more than the latter and closer to the 
former. The former no man or two men alone could have accomplished in the 
three years Jefferson and Wythe had.  
The enormity of the work that Jefferson and Wythe undertook is hard to 
appreciate even for lawyers. Lawyers work with one case at a time. In counseling 
they advise how they see the law in one or a handful of fact situations. In litigat-
ing they argue for one view that they see as benefiting their client. Judges focus 
on one set of facts and the laws that might apply to it. Law teachers in America 
assume the role of lawyers. Good lawmakers, on the other hand, must make pro-
vision for not one case, but for all possible cases, even though they well know 
that they cannot anticipate all cases. Good lawmakers must capture in a few un-
derstandable words what they want people to do. Good lawmakers must make 
their laws consistent internally and with other laws. John Austin saw that this 
“the technical part of legislation, is incomparably more difficult than what may 
be styled the ethical.
84
  
In legislating Jefferson was building a government of laws. He was the 
architect designing a new republic. His designs would demolish old law that was 
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inapplicable, oppressive, contrary to republican sensibilities, or simply not well-
adapted to present time and circumstances as the Act creating the committee con-
templated. Jefferson intended his designs to rationalize existing laws and institu-
tions and to create new ones. They would create government, guide governors in 
how to govern and instruct those governed in what was expected of them. He was 
ripping out common law that he found feudal, offensive or just plain foolish.  
Jefferson’s Revisal suggests no thought to using contemporary common 
law methods of lawmaking to bring about the republic of his visions. To the con-
trary, the Revisal was legislation. Jefferson could hardly have proceeded in any 
other way. Only statutes can root out old laws, refashion rationally remaining 
institutions, create wholly new institutions, and provide direction in how to gov-
ern. Jefferson sought to use legislation to do all four.
85
 In a democratic republic 
Jefferson could not decree judicially a new society and new laws. He had to get 
the assent of the democratically-elected legislature.  
The substance of Jefferson’s legislation.
86
 Historians focus—as did Jef-
ferson himself—on the substance of his legislative work. His biographers take 
from twenty-five to fifty pages to describe it. The bills of the Revisal alone were 
printed in ninety oversized folio pages in tiny type (over three hundred pages in a 
standard type face in a large octavo book). Other legislation he wrote or spon-
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sored was of comparable extent. He was, as the editor of his papers said, “a veri-
table legislative drafting bureau.”
87
 
Jefferson worked to build a new society. He designed legislation that 
struck at the very roots of the common law: the land law, inheritance and crimi-
nal law. According to one biographer, Jefferson intended to “completely over-
throw the English legal system that had chained Virginia for 170 years.”
88
 Jeffer-
son abolished primogeniture and completely changed rules of descent. He pro-
posed a new penal law “to proportion crimes and punishments in cases [previous-
ly] capital.” It failed of passage by a single vote. Jefferson drafted legislation that 
would end forever the idea that the common law made Christian doctrine a part 
of law. His legislation disestablished the Anglican Church in Virginia. His bill 
establishing religious liberty is the best-known of all his legislation.   
Jefferson sought to organize and rationalize common law institutions. 
His legislation restated and reorganized court institutions and procedures both 




Jefferson’s legislation reorganize government in all its branches. It pro-
vided for a state militia and navy, a board of war, a board of trade and a board of 
auditors. It districted the legislature and provided for elections and appointments. 
It created a public land office to administer claims to the western lands. 
Jefferson did not know how to treat slavery. He wanted to end it, but did 
not know how politically he could. Today his legislative proposals look modestly 
progressive at best and frighteningly racist at worst: gradual emancipation fol-
lowed by mandatory emigration.
90
 His other legislation addressed all manner of 
personal status, including slaves, indentured servants, mulattoes, citizens, and 
aliens. 
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Jefferson restated and rationalized a nascent regulatory state. His legisla-
tion addressed matters as diverse as infection and breeding of animals, licensing 
and regulating taverns, regulating mill-dams, public store-houses, commodities 
fraud, unwholesome meat and drink, public health vaccination and quarantine, 
usury, gaming and what we would call unfair competition. 
 Jefferson worked at building what we might call a social state. His legis-
lation provided for maintaining and building public roads, establishing ferries, a 
state postal service, support of the poor, registration of vital statistics, and legal 
aid in civil court proceedings. 
 Of all of his proposals for new legislation, Jefferson was most proud of 
his bills for “the more general diffusion of knowledge.” Jefferson wanted to es-
tablish universal public schooling. His bill for public education was an American 
model for a generation. He sought to establish a public research library, to reor-
ganize the College of William and Mary and to establish the University of Vir-
ginia.   
Jefferson’s dealing with statutes. Jefferson knew how to deal with stat-
utes. Some of his best practices included: 
 Professional drafting. In Jefferson’s day legislatures acting as a body 
generally drafted legislation within a single term of few months. The 
Act that Jefferson wrote took the Revisal out of the normal legisla-
tive cycle and gave the work to experts. The Act explained why: “a 
work of such magnitude, labor and difficulty, may not be effected 
during the short and busy terms of a session of Assembly.” 
 Justifications for bills. In Jefferson’s day legislation usually began 
simply, “be it enacted,” without explanation why. Jefferson, howev-
er, for his most important laws, prefaced them with elegant explana-




 Publication of the proposed legislation for public comment. General-
ly the Virginia legislature decided for itself the merits of proposed 
legislation. In a day of difficult communication and transportation 
and expensive printing, hardly any other course was conceivable. But 
in the case of the Revisal, the legislature directed printing of the re-
visal. It allowed for a comment period of nine months. The Act au-
thorizing printing explained why: “for the purpose of affording to the 
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citizens at large, an opportunity of examining and considering a work 




 Clarity of statutory language. Jefferson was aware of the need and 
the difficulty of expressing legal rules in language that expresses 
what is intended, while keeping all laws consistent with each other. 
The very idea of a comprehensive revisal in written law shows that. 
Jefferson sought to strike a balance between the old and the new in 
his drafting. He wrote co-draftsman Wythe: Wythe, “In its style I 
have aimed at accuracy, brevity and simplicity, preserving however 
the very words of the established law, wherever their meaning has 




 Understandable. High quality legislation requires written law that 
can be followed. His biographers—laymen—praise his language in 






Jefferson’s legal state.  Jefferson’s bills respecting education—although 
not adopted in his day in Virginia—show Jefferson’s aspirations for laws that 
would strike the right balance of defining the tasks of government and yet allow-
ing the governors sufficient flexibility to govern well.  
Government gives direction. Jefferson’s proposals give in detail how 
schools shall be established. They set out not only what shall be done, but who 
shall do it. “Electors” have their duties, “aldermen theirs,” and “overseers” theirs. 
The latter are to appoint, and remove teachers, and to examine scholars. Summa-
rizing Lerner observes:  
Visitors of the grammar schools are charged with hiring and fir-
ing the master and steward of the school, setting tuition, and ex-
amining the school, its staff, and its students. Both the overseers 
of the hundred and the visitors of the grammar schools are 
charged with seeing to it that any general instructional plan rec-
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ommended by the visitors of William and Mary College shall be 
observed. Teachers are accountable for their performance; just as 
they are for their fidelity to the commonwealth; overseers are ac-
countable for their recommendations and appointments; scholars 
are accountable for making the best of whatever genius they 
have. In short, the entire scheme for establishing and maintaining 
an educational system constitutes in itself an education in re-
sponsible self-governance. In lavishing these details upon the 
bill, Jefferson also gave his fullest explanation by example of 
what he meant by self-government. … [A] free people must be 
qualified ‘as judges of the actions and designs of men.’ Jeffer-
son’s bill encompasses that intention at every level.”
96
 
The ultimate judge of legislation is whether it works. Since much of what Jeffer-
son wrote was not adopted and since much that was adopted addressed soon-to-
be-obsolete matters, it is difficult to characterize how well his bills would have 
worked. But some can be measured. One commentator singled out Jefferson’s 
Statute of Descents of October 1775 a century later. That law “demolished” “eve-
ry shred of the pre-existing (English) law of descents” and established new law 
based on contradictory principles. Nonetheless, the admirer wrote: “So precise, 
so comprehensive and exhaustive, so simple and clear, were the terms in which 
they were expressed, that in the experience of a completed century but one single 
doubt as to the construction and effect of any part of it has arisen.”
97 
6. Conclusion 
Ten years ago Professor Charles Abernathy told a German audience of lawyers 
and judges, that although they and their American counterparts might see the 
roots of the American legal system in English common law and a common law 
process of simultaneously making and applying law, “with respect to constitu-
tional law—America’s greatest legal contribution to modern respect for the rule 
of law, the roots of the U.S. legal system are firmly planted in Europe, not Eng-
land.”
98
 I have suggested here that much the same might be said of American 
lawmaking generally.  
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In this contribution, I have not been concerned with where the ideas of 
Adams and Jefferson came from, but where they might lead. Their government of 
laws and not of men partakes more of a democratic legal state than it does of the 
Dicey-like rule of law of the contemporary common law. Their state is a state 
based on statutes adopted by democratic legislatures using procedures intended to 
produce laws that promote the common good. Their statutes are well-crafted and 
consistent within themselves and with other laws to the end that no one should be 
forced to break one law in order to follow another.  Their laws guide the peo-
ple—the governed and governors alike—toward making good decisions based on 
personal responsibility. Their directions are understandable and not obtuse. They 
can be faithfully interpreted. They do not presume to decide all issues of their 
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